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Nearly 10 years have passed since the recognition of 
glycopeptide-resistant enterococci (GRE) as a clinical 
problem [l], and our knowledge of the epidemiology 
of these organisms has greatly increased. Despite this, 
there is comparatively little information available to 
guide our efforts in controlling GRE. Once GRE 
become established in a clinical area, they may cause a 
range of infections, associated with a high mortality, for 
which therapeutic options are limited. Moreover, there 
is potential for glycopeptide resistance genes to spread 
to other, more virulent organisms: gene transfer has 
already been achieved in vitro to produce a pheno- 
typically vancomycin-resistant strain of Staphylococcus 
aureus [2]. For these reasons, strenuous efforts are 
warranted to minimize the spread of GRE. Until 
recently, the source of GRE (other than colonized 
patients in hospitals) was unclear. In 1994, Bates and 
colleagues isolated glycopeptide-resistant Enterococcus 
faecium h m  farm animals (including pigs and chickens), 
raw sewage and raw chicken [3]. From this and other 
reports it is now clear that GRE of the oanA genotype 
are present in animals and meat products in Europe, and 
that uanA resistance genes may be introduced into the 
community via the food chain. GRE may be entering 
the hospital environment via colonized individuals 
admitted &om the community [4]. 
In North America, recommendations for the 
prevention of spread of glycopeptide resistance have 
been published by the Hospital Infection Control 
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Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC), in collabo- 
ration with the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) [5]. These recommendations are 
based on four key elements: prudent vancomycin use; 
education of hospital st@ early detection and prompt 
reporting; and immediate implementation of infection 
control measures. The HICPAC recommendations 
may not be entirely applicable to practice outside the 
USA, due to differences in medcal management and 
facilities, but they provide a useful basis for discussion 
of appropriate control measures h m  the perspective of 
UK practice. 
ANTIBIOTIC POLICIES 
Patients who are exposed to prolonged or multiple 
antimicrobial therapy are at risk of becoming colonized 
by GRE [6,7]. Moreover, certain antibiotics, par- 
ticularly vancomycin [6,8,9] and cephalosporins [lo], 
have been implicated in selecting for GRE. Although 
high levels of vancomycin may be achieved in the 
gut during oral vancomycin therapy [ll-131, probably 
above those needed to kill GRE, levels will nevertheless 
tail off after treatment, potentially selecting for resistant 
strains both in patients and in the environment. The 
HICPAC guidelines advocate prudent use of vanco- 
mycin as a central measure in preventing the spread of 
vancomycin resistance, suggesting specific situations in 
which its use should be discouraged [5]. In Europe, 
where the glycopeptide drug teicoplanin is widely 
used, any proposed restrictions on the c h c a l  use of 
vancomycin should also apply to teicoplanin. For this 
reason we favor the term ‘glycopeptide-resistant entero- 
cocci’ to the widely used ‘vancomycin-resistant entero- 
cocci-VRE’. Situations in which we consider that 
glycopeptide drugs are not normally indicated are 
shown in Table 1. 
Modifylng the use of antibiotics other than 
glycopeptides has also been tried. For example, in a 
London outbreak [l] a switch &om vancomycin and 
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Table 1 Situations in which glycopeptide drugs are not 
normally indicated 
Fint-line therapy for neutropenic sepsis 
Continued empirical use when cultures are negative 
First-line treatment of Clostridium dficile infection 
Routine prophylaxis for surgery, neonates, dialysis, intravenous 
catheters 
Convenience treatment of methicillin-sensitive organisms in renal 
failure 
Single blood culture positive for coagulase-negative staphylococci 
Eradication of methicillin-resistant S. aweus colonization 
Selective decontamination of the gut 
Topical application or irrigation 
cephalosporins to flucloxacillin and aztreonam was 
thought to be helpful in controlling the outbreak, in 
combination with other measures (A. Uttley, personal 
communication). 
EDUCATING HEALTHCARE WORKERS 
Medical and nursing st& should be notified of the 
appearance of GRE at an early stage. This will enable 
an explanation of the problem to be given and should 
encourage cooperation in the subsequent efforts to 
control the organisms. In our experience, seminars held 
for healthcare workers on affected wards, reinforced by 
regular visits h m  the infection control team, have been 
useful in heightening awareness of infection control 
issues. Teaching should include: sources and modes of 
spread of GRE; handwashmg technique; disposal of 
linen; assessment of patients for potential risk factors 
for cross-infection, such as diarrhea [14,15] and poor 
personal hygiene; and the importance of a clean 
environment [16]. Difficulties may be encountered in 
achieving and maintaining good practice in clinical 
areas, particularly in environmental cleaning (due to 
nursing and domestic shortages), and isolation of 
carriers and handwashing (due to lack offacilities) [17]. 
SCREENING FOR GRE 
In studying the epidemiology of GRE, it is important 
to assess human carriage rates in different populations 
and to search for the organisms in the environment. 
Carriage rates have varied from relatively low levels up 
to 75% [18]. This variation is likely to reflect the type 
of patient and medical setting studied and will be a 
product of the recognized risk factors, such as antibiotic 
exposure, immunosuppression and intensive nursing. It 
is probable that apparent variations in carriage rate will 
also have arisen from differences in methodology, 
including protocols for screening (which sites, how 
often) and laboratory procedures, such as choice of 
meda. 
Screening patients 
To date, few published studies have compared the 
recovery from dif€erent body sites when screening for 
carriage. Yamaguch et al. studied 20 patients in a 
teaching hospital who were known to be colonized 
by glycopeptide-resistant E. faeciurn [19]. Swabs were 
obtained from nose, mouth, behind the ears, axillae, 
popliteal fossae and groins and plated directly onto 
Campylobacter agar. GRE were most frequently isolated 
from stools (95%); recovery from other sites was poor 
(25%). In a study of 46 patients on a liver unit, who 
were all known carriers of glycopeptide-resistant E. 
faeciurn, carriage was evaluated by screening mouth, 
nose, throat, rectum and perineum [20]. Swabs were 
plated both directly and after broth enrichment onto 
MacConkey agar. The ‘full set’ of screening swabs 
would have detected 80% carriers, rectal plus perineal 
swabs would have detected 69% and a rectal or perineal 
swab alone would have detected 6143%. In a third 
teachmg hospital, patients were screened prospectively 
for carriage during an outbreak of glycopeptide- 
resistant E. faen’urn colonization on a renal/hematology 
ward [21]. Specimens from nose, throat, axilla, peri- 
neum, hands and fecedrectum were cultured, with and 
without broth enrichment, on MacConkey agar and 
neomycin blood agar. Of the colonized patients, 26/29 
(90%) would have been detected by culture of a 
perineal swab and fecedrectal swab. Further work is 
needed to evaluate optimum screening protocols for 
defined patient groups, but culture of fecedrectal swab 
and perineal swab (plus relevant clinical specimens) 
should provide a satisfactory, fiordable screen. Infection 
control teams should formulate policies on which 
patients to screen for these organisms, at which sites and 
how often. 
Choice of medium for screening 
Various agar media containing vancomycin have been 
used to screen clinical specimens for GRE. Examples 
are colistin nalidixic acid agar [8], Carnpylobacter agar 
with clindamycin [22], kanamycin aescuhn azide agar 
141, neomycin agar [14] and MacConkey agar [20]. 
Insufficient comparative information is available at 
present to make a clear recommendation about which 
solid media perform best, for screening either patients 
or the environment. We have found neomycin blood 
agar to be unsatisfactory for screening fecal specimens 
[23], while aztreonam-amphotericin blood agar [24] 
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and bile-aesculin-Polymixin B agars, both containing 
vancomycin, have performed well (unpublished data). 
Finally, the use of broth-based media needs considera- 
tion; Landman and colleagues compared five dfferent 
procedures for recovering GRE from perianal swabs 
and found Enterococcosel broth (containing bile- 
aesculin and sodium azide), supplemented with aztreo- 
nam and vancomycin, to be more sensitive than three 
agar media [25]. In a comparison of cephalexin- 
aztreonam-arabinose agar [26] and cephalexin-aztreo- 
nam broth, broth enrichment was found to more than 
double the yield from a mixture ofpatient and environ- 
mental specimens [27]. Further comparative studies of 
solid and broth-based media are urgently needed. 
Screening healthcare workers 
There is little evidence to implicate s t d i n  transmission 
of GRE. In one report a nurse had to be removed from 
duty before an outbreak due to a multiply-resistant 
(but vancomycin-sensitive) Enterococctrs faecalis could 
be terminated [28]. In a second report, exposure of 
patients to a nurse who looked after a known GRE- 
colonized patient on the same shfi  was associated 
with acquiring an outbreak strain [14]. Screening of 
healthcare workers has only been recommended if a 
clear epidemiologic link with transmission can be 
shown [5]. 
Eradication of asymptomatic carriage 
The observation that large numbers of individuals can 
be colonized by GRE for a prolonged period during 
an outbreak [14], and can develop clinical infection or 
transmit the organism to others, has led to attempts to 
clear gastrointestinal carriage. O’Donovan et al. found 
that oral bacitracin eradicated carriage in 2/8 patients, 
while oral vancomycin cleared colonization in 8/19 
[29]. Although oral vancomycin has been found to 
achieve levels of >I000 mg/kg in feces in patients with 
Clostridium d@de colonization or infection [ll-131, 
lower leveIs, which may not reliably inhibit enterococci 
of the VanA or VanB phenotypes, have also been 
reported [30]. Novobiocin plus tetracycline has been 
found to be ineffective for clearing GRE colonization 
and poorly tolerated 1311. The strategy of trying to 
eradicate colonization with antimicrobial agents (parti- 
cularly glycopeptides) is likely to be counterproductive 
by promoting drug resistance. This would be un- 
acceptable. 
INFECTION CONTROL MEASURES 
Isolation precautions 
It is very dfficult to eradicate GRE once they become 
established, and aggressive control measures at an early 
stage may be justified to h t  their spread [5]. In order 
to prevent transmission in an outbreak setting, nursing 
patients in single rooms with the use of gloves and 
gowns (the latter to prevent contamination of health- 
care workers from the environment) has been successful 
[6,14]. Cohorting of nursing s t a f f  and patients may also 
be helpful, but depends upon the provision of adequate 
staffing numbers [8]. Antiseptic agents have been 
recommended for handwashing [5], since it has been 
shown that ardicially inoculated E. faecium may survive 
on hands for 30 min and is more effectively removed 
by using alcoholic chlorhexidine than soap and water 
[32,33]. 
In our experience, it has not usually been possible 
to geographically isolate all colonized patients, due to 
lack of adequate facilities. We have therefore adopted a 
risk management approach in deciding which patients 
should be isolated, concentrating particularly on in- 
dividuals with diarrhea. Patients with diarrhea are 
at high risk of disseminating enterococci, causing 
greater environmental contamination than colonized 
individuals without diarrhea, potentially providing a 
reservoir for an outbreak strain of GRE [ 14,151. It may 
be reasonable when isolation facilities are not readily 
available for a patient with diarrhea but good personal 
hygiene to be cared for on the main ward rather than 
isolated in a cubicle without toilet facilities, where there 
will be increased handling of bedpans and commodes 
by nursing s&. Conversely, a patient colonized by 
GRE, but without diarrhea and with poor personal 
hygiene, may be most appropriately cared for in 
isolation, if this is available [17]. 
Transfer of colonized patients between hospitals 
Once GRE are established in a hospital, it is easy to see 
how transfer of resistance genes to other hospitals can 
occur, either knowingly or unwittingly. Transfer of a 
colonized patient between two leukemia units in the 
UK has already been associated with an outbreak at the 
receiving site [34], and several strains of ‘epidemic 
vancomycin-resistant enterococci’ have been described 
[35]. Infection control teams should notify the re- 
ceiving hospital on transfer of a patient known to be 
colonized by GRE. Consideration should also be 
given to the transfer of GRE-colonized patients 
from hospitals back into the community. There is 
growing concern in nursing homes about other 
resistant bacteria such as methicillin-resistant S. aureur 
and such institutions could also provide a reservoir for 
GRE [18]. 
Role of the environment 
The role of the inanimate environment in the trans- 
mission of enterococci has not been fully elucidated, 
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but enterococci, including GRE, have been recovered 
fiom the environment in several studies [8,14,36,37]. 
Contamination has been detected in the general 
environment surrounding patients (e.g. beds) and on 
medical equipment such as infusion pumps, blood 
pressure c a ,  stethoscopes and monitoring equipment. 
Such sites provide the opportunity for spread between 
patients, either directly, or via attending healthcare 
workers. We have found contamination of similar sites 
on our wards. Some sites of contamination, includmg 
door and toilet handles, taps and pedal wastebin lids, 
provide strong indirect evidence of transmission of 
GRE on hands. Similarly, GRE have been isolated fiom 
the hand controls of a portable X-ray machine (C.D. 
Chadwick, personal communication), the contamina- 
tion presumably occurring as radiographers moved to 
and fio between the patient and the machine. Two 
specific inanimate objects, electronic rectal thermo- 
meters [lo] and air-fluidized microsphere beds [38], 
have been epidemiologically implicated in the trans- 
mission of E. fnecium. 
The finding of widespread GRE contamination in 
the environment highlights the need to review cleaning 
and disinfection practices. P r e h n a r y  findings in our 
own unit show a good correlation between thorough 
environmental cleaning and a subsequent reduction in 
the rate of colonization of susceptible patients [16]. 
Unfortunately, due to staffing shortages and a change 
in nursing philosophy fiom task-orientated nursing care 
(including specific responsibihties for cleaning equip- 
ment) to a team-nursing approach (with responsibilities 
to specific patients rather than tasks), basic ward 
hygiene and equipment decontamination is being given 
an increasingly low priority. 
Washing and disinfection procedures 
Enterococci are hardy bacteria and have long been 
recognized to be relatively heat tolerant, surviving heat 
at 60°C for 30min. It has been suggested that some 
nosocomial isolates of E. fneciurn may survive at 80°C 
for 3 min, raising concerns that current washing and 
disinfection measures in hospitals may be inadequate 
[39]. However, heat tolerance testing of GRE isolates 
from Manchester failed to confirm the degree of heat 
tolerance found by Freeman et al.; we found that 
although some isolates of glycopeptide-resistant E. 
faeciurn were able to survive heat at 65°C for 10 min, 
none survived heat at 71°C [40]. The finding that 
several isolates survived heat at 65 "C for 10 min (viable 
counts were reduced by <5 loglo) raises some concerns 
about the efficiency of one of the recommended 
standards for the disinfection of infected linen [41], but 
it should be stressed that our tests assessed the effect of 
heat in the absence of a physical washng process. In 
practice, Wilcox and Jones were unable to demonstrate 
in situ survival of clinical isolates of enterococci at 
71°C for 6 min in a hospital continuous batch tunnel 
washer [42]. It may be prudent to use a higher (71°C) 
temperature for the laundry process whenever possible. 
Providing that current guidelines are followed for 
bedpan washer-disinfectors [43] and hospital laundry 
arrangements [41], and so long as equipment is properly 
maintained [44], these processes should not pose a 
particular risk for nosocomial transmission of GRE. 
CONCLUSION 
In order to control GRE, we need to implement 
the traditional values of good personal hygiene and 
environmental cleanliness. Sound infection control 
practices should be reinforced with prudent antibiotic 
use in all clinical areas. GRE are already draining 
valuable laboratory and ward resources, in te rm of 
both outbreaks and screening of high-risk patients. 
They d continue to constitute an important infection 
control problem for the forseeable hture. 
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